Signaling, Globality, and the Intuitive Criterion

Christian Ewerhart and Philipp Wichardt

No 189, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver's preferences. The paper considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturbation of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterion suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the global signaling game is essentially unique.

Keywords: Global Games; Signaling; Intuitive Criterion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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