Contest success function with the possibility of a draw: axiomatization

Pavlo Blavatskyy

No 208, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: In imperfectly discriminating contests the contestants contribute effort to win a prize but the highest contributed effort does not necessarily secure a win. The contest success function (CSF) is the technology that translates an individual�s effort into his or her probability of winning. This paper provides an axiomatization of CSF when there is the possibility of a draw (the sum of winning probabilities across all contestants is non-additive)..

Keywords: contest success function; draw; logit; irrelevant alternatives; imperfectly discriminating (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm
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