The evolution of cheating in asymmetric contests
Esther Bruegger and
Simon Loertscher ()
No 314, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich
Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with local information. Three factors determine the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the agents. In particular we find that the economy is more likely to end up in a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the agents are maximally segregated.
Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; imitation dynamics; heterogeneity; local information; global interaction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C79 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:314
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