Overprotected Politicians

Bruno Frey

No 321, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper argues that politicians are overprotected. The costs of political assassination differ systematically depending on whether a private or a public point of view is taken. A politician attributes a very high (if not infinite) cost to his or her survival. The social cost of political assassination is much smaller as politicians are replaceable. Conversely, the private cost of the security measures is low for politicians, its bulk � including time loss and inconvenience � is imposed on taxpayers and the general public. The extent of overprotection is larger in dictatorial than in democratic countries.

Keywords: Politicians; rational choice; assassination; security; democracy; dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D70 H50 J28 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Overprotected Politicians (2007)
Working Paper: Overprotected Politicians (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:321

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