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The Envious Punisher: Understanding Third and Second Party Punishment with Simple Games

Andreas Leibbrandt () and Ra�l L�pez-P�rez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Raúl López-Pérez

No 373, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We provide a systematic comparison of punishment from unaffected third parties and affected second parties using a within-subject design in ten simple games. We apply the classification analysis by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) and find that a parsimonious model assuming subjects are either envious or selfish best explains the punishment from both third and second parties. Third and second parties punish richer co-players, even if they chose a socially or Pareto-efficient allocation or if they are merely bystanders who made no choice. Despite their unaffected position, we do not find that third parties punish in a more impartial or normative manner.

Keywords: Envy; fairness; inequity aversion; norms; punishment; reciprocity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C91 D63 D74 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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