An experimental study of jury deliberation

Jacob Goeree and Leeat Yariv

No 438, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two-thirds majority, and unanimity). When deliberation is prohibited, different institutions generate significantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation, however, significantly diminishes institutional differences and uniformly improves efficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an array of stable attributes: messages are public, consistently reveal private information, provide a good predictor for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous) sequencing.

Keywords: Jury decision making; deliberative voting; strategic voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta and nep-exp
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:438

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