How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment

Jingjing Zhang and Marco Casari

No 506, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: This paper studies how groups resolve disagreement in lottery choices. In an experiment, subjects submit individual proposals, exchange chat messages, and must reach unanimity. Overall, group choices are more coherent and closer to risk neutrality than individuals�. The proposal of the minority prevails in about one instance out of five. About one third of the groups do not reach immediate agreement after communication. In these groups, extrovert subjects are more likely to lead the group outcome than confused or conscientious subjects. The amount, equality and timing of chat messages help us to predict which choice prevails in the group.

JEL-codes: C92 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51765/1/iewwp506.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: HOW GROUPS REACH AGREEMENT IN RISKY CHOICES: AN EXPERIMENT (2012)
Working Paper: How groups reach agreement in risky choices: an experiment (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zur:iewwpx:506

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