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Details about Yeon-Koo Che
Access statistics for papers by Yeon-Koo Che.
Last updated 2009-03-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pch91
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Working Papers
2008
- Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation, Yale University 
Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2008)
- Expanding "Choice" in School Choice
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics View citations
- Strategic Judgment Proofing
NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 
Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2005)  MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006) 
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2008)
2007
- Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics View citations
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2007) View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (2008)
- How to Divide the Possession of a Football?
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics View citations
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006) 
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2008)
- Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Opinion as Incentives
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2007)
- Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2007) View citations Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2006) View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2009)
2006
- Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment
Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2006)  Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2005) View citations Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (2006) 
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
- Auctioning the Nfl Overtime Possession
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics
- Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics View citations
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006) View citations
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2006)
- Market Versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics 
Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006)
- Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2005)  NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org (2005) 
See also Journal Article in Theoretical Economics (2006)
- The Hold-up Problem
ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh View citations
- The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics View citations
2005
- On the Value of Legal Representation
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics View citations
- Robustly collusion-proof implementation
Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics View citations
See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2006)
2004
- A Dynamic Theory of Holdup
ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh View citations
Also in Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (2001) View citations
See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2004)
- Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
- Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective
ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh View citations
Also in Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (2004) View citations
2001
- Know thy enemies: knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
2000
- Optimal Design of Research Contests
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society View citations
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2003)
1998
- Caps on Political Lobbying
Microeconomics, EconWPA View citations
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1998)
- Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2000)
- Optimal incentives for teams
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2001)
- Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance
Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management 
See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1999)
- Section 365: mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuation
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
1997
- Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1999)
1996
- Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments
UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics View citations
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1999)
- Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
- The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
Also in Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (1995) Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (1994)
1995
- Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (1997)
- Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Industrial Economics (1996)
- Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
- Optimal Use of Information Litigation: Should Regulatory Information be Withheld to Deter Frivolus Suits?
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
1994
- Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result
Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
1993
- Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1991)
1992
- "Revolving Doors" and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
- Adverse Selection in Class Action Suits
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
- The Economics of Collective Negociation: Consolidation of Claims by Multiple Plaintiffs
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
1991
- Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1993)
- The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation
Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1993)
Journal Articles
2009
- Optimal collusion-proof auctions
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (2), 565-603 
See also Working Paper (2007)
2008
- Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 4-23 
See also Working Paper (2007)
- How to divide the possession of a football?
Economics Letters, 2008, 99, (3), 561-565 
See also Working Paper (2007)
- Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 127-129
- Strategic judgment proofing
RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (4), 926-948 
See also Working Paper (2008)
2007
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment
Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, (2), 240-259 View citations
See also Working Paper (2006)
2006
- Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
American Economic Review, 2006, 96, (4), 1355-1360 View citations
See also Working Paper (2006)
- Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
Theoretical Economics, 2006, 1, (1), 95-118 View citations
See also Working Paper (2006)
- Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
Econometrica, 2006, 74, (4), 1063-1107 View citations
See also Working Paper (2005)
2004
- A Dynamic Theory of Holdup
Econometrica, 2004, 72, (4), 1063-1103 View citations
See also Working Paper (2004)
- Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions
Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46, (2), 383-397 View citations
- Competitive Procurement with Corruption
RAND Journal of Economics, 2004, 35, (1), 50-68 View citations
2003
- Optimal Design of Research Contests
American Economic Review, 2003, 93, (3), 646-671 View citations
See also Working Paper (2000)
2002
- The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining
International Economic Review, 2002, 43, (2), 549-576 View citations
2001
- Optimal Incentives for Teams
American Economic Review, 2001, 91, (3), 525-541 View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)
2000
- Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999)
Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, 33, (2), 195-205
- Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions
Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, 30, (1), 22-43 View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)
- The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer
Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 92, (2), 198-233 View citations
1999
- Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments
RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 30, (1), 84-105 View citations
See also Working Paper (1996)
- Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
American Economic Review, 1999, 89, (1), 125-147 View citations
See also Working Paper (1997)
- Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1
European Economic Review, 1999, 43, (4-6), 947-957
- Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1999, 15, (2), 441-67 View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)
1998
- Caps on Political Lobbying
American Economic Review, 1998, 88, (3), 643-51 View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)
- Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
Review of Economic Studies, 1998, 65, (1), 1-21 View citations
1997
- Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997, 6, (1), 175-200 View citations
See also Working Paper (1995)
- Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Should Regulatory Information Be Withheld to Deter Frivolous Suits?
RAND Journal of Economics, 1997, 28, (1), 120-134
- Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained
Public Choice, 1997, 92, (1-2), 109-26 View citations
1996
- Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods
Journal of Industrial Economics, 1996, 44, (1), 17-24 View citations
See also Working Paper (1995)
- Equilibrium formation of class action suits
Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 62, (3), 339-361 View citations
- Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
Economics Letters, 1996, 50, (3), 373-379 View citations
1995
- Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion
RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, 26, (3), 378-397 View citations
1994
- Buy-in through goldplating: The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination
Economics Letters, 1994, 45, (3), 397-405
1993
- Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions
RAND Journal of Economics, 1993, 24, (4), 668-680 View citations
See also Working Paper (1991)
- The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1993, 9, (2), 399-424 View citations
See also Working Paper (1991)
1991
- Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (4), 562-570 View citations
See also Working Paper (1993)
Editor
- Journal of Industrial Economics
Blackwell Publishing
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