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Details about Yeon-Koo Che

E-mail:
Homepage:http://www.columbia.edu/~yc2271
Phone:212-854-8276
Postal address:Department of Economics, Columbia University, NY, NY 10027
Workplace:Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, (more information at EDIRC)
Economics Department, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Yeon-Koo Che.

Last updated 2009-03-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pch91


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Working Papers

2008

  1. Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
    Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation, Yale University Downloads
    Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2008) Downloads
  2. Expanding "Choice" in School Choice
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations
  3. Strategic Judgment Proofing
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads
    Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2005) Downloads
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2008)

2007

  1. Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2007) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (2008)
  2. How to Divide the Possession of a Football?
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2008)
  3. Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads
  4. Opinion as Incentives
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations
    Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2007) Downloads
  5. Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2007) Downloads View citations
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2006) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2009)

2006

  1. Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics Downloads View citations
    Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2006) Downloads
    Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2005) Downloads View citations
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (2006) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2007)
  2. Auctioning the Nfl Overtime Possession
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads
  3. Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2006)
  4. Market Versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads
    Also in MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany (2006) Downloads
  5. Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations
    Also in Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics (2005) Downloads
    NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org (2005) Downloads

    See also Journal Article in Theoretical Economics (2006)
  6. The Hold-up Problem
    ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh Downloads View citations
  7. The Role of Lockups in Takeover Contests
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations

2005

  1. On the Value of Legal Representation
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations
  2. Robustly collusion-proof implementation
    Discussion Papers, Columbia University, Department of Economics Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2006)

2004

  1. A Dynamic Theory of Holdup
    ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh Downloads View citations
    Also in Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (2001) Downloads View citations

    See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2004)
  2. Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Downloads View citations
  3. Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective
    ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh Downloads View citations
    Also in Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (2004) Downloads View citations

2001

  1. Know thy enemies: knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Downloads

2000

  1. Optimal Design of Research Contests
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2003)

1998

  1. Caps on Political Lobbying
    Microeconomics, EconWPA Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1998)
  2. Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2000)
  3. Optimal incentives for teams
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2001)
  4. Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance
    Yale School of Management Working Papers, Yale School of Management Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1999)
  5. Section 365: mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuation
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Downloads

1997

  1. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1999)

1996

  1. Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments
    UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1999)
  2. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
  3. The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
    Also in Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (1995)
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems (1994)

1995

  1. Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy (1997)
  2. Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Industrial Economics (1996)
  3. Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
  4. Optimal Use of Information Litigation: Should Regulatory Information be Withheld to Deter Frivolus Suits?
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

1994

  1. Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result
    Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Downloads

1993

  1. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1991)

1992

  1. "Revolving Doors" and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
  2. Adverse Selection in Class Action Suits
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
  3. The Economics of Collective Negociation: Consolidation of Claims by Multiple Plaintiffs
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

1991

  1. Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1993)
  2. The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation
    Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1993)

Journal Articles

2009

  1. Optimal collusion-proof auctions
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2009, 144, (2), 565-603 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2007)

2008

  1. Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 4-23 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2007)
  2. How to divide the possession of a football?
    Economics Letters, 2008, 99, (3), 561-565 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2007)
  3. Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2008, 164, (1), 127-129 Downloads
  4. Strategic judgment proofing
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2008, 39, (4), 926-948 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2008)

2007

  1. Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, (2), 240-259 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2006)

2006

  1. Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply
    American Economic Review, 2006, 96, (4), 1355-1360 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2006)
  2. Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
    Theoretical Economics, 2006, 1, (1), 95-118 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2006)
  3. Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation
    Econometrica, 2006, 74, (4), 1063-1107 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2005)

2004

  1. A Dynamic Theory of Holdup
    Econometrica, 2004, 72, (4), 1063-1103 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2004)
  2. Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46, (2), 383-397 Downloads View citations
  3. Competitive Procurement with Corruption
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2004, 35, (1), 50-68 View citations

2003

  1. Optimal Design of Research Contests
    American Economic Review, 2003, 93, (3), 646-671 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (2000)

2002

  1. The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining
    International Economic Review, 2002, 43, (2), 549-576 Downloads View citations

2001

  1. Optimal Incentives for Teams
    American Economic Review, 2001, 91, (3), 525-541 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1998)

2000

  1. Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999)
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, 33, (2), 195-205 Downloads
  2. Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2000, 30, (1), 22-43 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1998)
  3. The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2000, 92, (2), 198-233 Downloads View citations

1999

  1. Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1999, 30, (1), 84-105 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)
  2. Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
    American Economic Review, 1999, 89, (1), 125-147 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1997)
  3. Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1
    European Economic Review, 1999, 43, (4-6), 947-957 Downloads
  4. Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1999, 15, (2), 441-67 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1998)

1998

  1. Caps on Political Lobbying
    American Economic Review, 1998, 88, (3), 643-51 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1998)
  2. Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
    Review of Economic Studies, 1998, 65, (1), 1-21 Downloads View citations

1997

  1. Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition
    Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 1997, 6, (1), 175-200 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)
  2. Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Should Regulatory Information Be Withheld to Deter Frivolous Suits?
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1997, 28, (1), 120-134 Downloads
  3. Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained
    Public Choice, 1997, 92, (1-2), 109-26 Downloads View citations

1996

  1. Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods
    Journal of Industrial Economics, 1996, 44, (1), 17-24 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1995)
  2. Equilibrium formation of class action suits
    Journal of Public Economics, 1996, 62, (3), 339-361 Downloads View citations
  3. Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
    Economics Letters, 1996, 50, (3), 373-379 Downloads View citations

1995

  1. Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1995, 26, (3), 378-397 Downloads View citations

1994

  1. Buy-in through goldplating: The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination
    Economics Letters, 1994, 45, (3), 397-405 Downloads

1993

  1. Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1993, 24, (4), 668-680 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)
  2. The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation
    Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 1993, 9, (2), 399-424 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1991

  1. Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (4), 562-570 Downloads View citations
    See also Working Paper (1993)

Editor

  1. Journal of Industrial Economics
    Blackwell Publishing
 
 
Page updated 2009-11-25