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Details about Sergio Currarini

E-mail:
Homepage:http://venus.unive.it/currarin
Postal address:Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche S. Giobbe 873 30121 Venezia, Italia
Workplace:Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (Department of Economics), Facoltà di Economia (Faculty of Economics), Università degli Studi di Venezia "Ca' Foscari", (more information at EDIRC)
Economics and Organization, School for Advanced Studies in Venice, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Sergio Currarini.

Last updated 2008-10-02. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pcu4


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Working Papers

2008

  1. Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly
    Working Papers, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics Downloads

2007

  1. An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation
    Working Papers, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics Downloads View citations
  2. Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly
    Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck Downloads
    Also in Working Papers, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics (2007) Downloads

2006

  1. Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities
    Working Papers, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Research in Economics (2006)
  2. Network Design in Games with Spillovers
    Working Papers, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Review of Economic Design (2007)

2004

  1. Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies
    Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Downloads View citations
    See also Journal Article in International Game Theory Review (IGTR) (2006)

2003

  1. A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations
  2. On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities
    Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Downloads View citations

2000

  1. Network Formation with Sequential Demands
    Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London Downloads View citations

Journal Articles

2007

  1. Group stability of hierarchies in games with spillovers
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, 54, (3), 187-202 Downloads View citations
  2. Network design in games with spillovers
    Review of Economic Design, 2007, 10, (4), 305-326 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2006)

2006

  1. COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
    International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2006, 08, (01), 111-126 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2004)
  2. Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities
    Research in Economics, 2006, 60, (2), 112-119 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2006)

2005

  1. Voting on federations
    Research in Economics, 2005, 59, (1), 1-21 Downloads

2002

  1. Inflation, Welfare, and Public Good
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, 4, (3), 369-86 Downloads
  2. Voting on public goods in multi-jurisdictional systems
    Research in Economics, 2002, 56, (2), 215-230 Downloads

2000

  1. original papers: Network formation with sequential demands
    Review of Economic Design, 2000, 5, (3), 229-249 Downloads
 
 
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