Details about Oliver Fabel

Access statistics for papers by Oliver Fabel.

Last updated 2009-09-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pfa116

Working Papers

2009

1. Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study
   CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich View citations

2007

2. Entrepreneurial Elites: Industry Structure Investment, and Welfare Effects of Incubating New Businesses
   TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz
3. On 'Golden Parachutes' as Manager Discipline
   TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz
4. Recruitment of Overeducated Personnel: Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices
   TWI Research Paper Series, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz
5. Recruitment of Seemingly Overeducated Personnel: Insider-Outsider Effects on Fair Employee Selection Practices
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany

2006

6. The Division of Ownership in New Ventures
   SFB 649 Discussion Papers, Humboldt University, Collaborative Research Center 649 View citations
   Also in Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim (2004) View citations

2005

7. Entrepreneurial Elites: Industry Structure and Welfare Effects of Incubating New Businesses
   Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim

2004

8. Autonomy of the University and the Professionalisation of its Organisation of Control
   Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim

2003

9. Spin-offs of Entrepreneurial Firms: an O-Ring Approach The O-Ring theory provides a framework to analyse the emergence of firms organized as partnerships. The owner-managers of such entrepreneurial firms can benefit from ability matching within their production teams. However, they must also bear the project risk. Risk-aversion then induces a second-best solution. At the same time, integrated firms managed on behalf of risk-neutral residual-claimants face information and/or enforcement problems. Hence, they cannot organize ability-matched teams. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium such that groups of individuals sharing a superior ability level will found entrepreneurial firms. Low-quality individuals will be employed by managed firms which hire randomly. The paper constitutes a significantly revised version of the study formerly entitled "The Emergence of a New Economy: An O-Ring Approach", Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Discussion Paper Series I - 314
   Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim

2002

10. Firm Foundations and Human Capital Investments: the O-Ring Approach to Organizational Equilibrium in an Emerging Industry
    Working Papers of the Research Group Heterogenous Labor, Research Group Heterogeneous Labor, University of Konstanz/ZEW Mannheim

1987

11. Manufacturing export performance at the state level, 1963-1980
    Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Journal Articles

2009

1. Research Productivity in Business Economics: A Reply
   German Economic Review, 2009, 10, 249-252
2. Research Productivity in Business Economics: A Second Reply
   German Economic Review, 2009, 10, 372-374

2008

3. Editorial: Zum Schwerpunkt Forschungs-Rankings
   Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, 2008, 9, (3), 252-253
4. Research Productivity in Business Economics: An Investigation of Austrian, German and Swiss Universities
   German Economic Review, 2008, 9, 506-531 View citations

2007

5. Entrepreneurship and the Division of Ownership in New Ventures
   Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2007, 16, (1), 111-128

2004

6. Eliteuniversitäten: Stärkung des Forschungs- und Wirtschaftsstandorts Deutschland?
   Ifo Schnelldienst, 2004, 57, (16), 03-11
7. Spinoffs of Entrepreneurial Firms: An O-Ring Approach
   Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2004, 160, (3), 416- View citations

2002

8. Adverse Selection and Market Substitution by Electronic Trade
   International Journal of the Economics of Business, 2002, 9, (2), 175-193 View citations
9. Rational probation decisions for juvenile delinquents
   Economics of Governance, 2002, 3, (3), 249-274
10. Severance Pay Rules And Structural Layoff Decisions
    Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr), 2002, 54, (2), 118-135 View citations

1999

11. Optimal parole decisions1
    International Review of Law and Economics, 1999, 19, (2), 159-166 View citations

1995

12. Disability insurance in an optimal pension scheme
    Journal of Economics, 1995, 62, (2), 157-183

1994

13. Social security, optimal retirement, and savings
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 10, (4), 783-802 View citations

1990

14. Implicit contracts with effort incentives
    Journal of Economics, 1990, 52, (1), 25-42

1988

15. State Factor Endowments and Exports: An Alternative to Cross-Industry Studies
    The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1988, 70, (4), 696-701 View citations