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Details about Peter T. Leeson

E-mail:
Homepage:http://www.PeterLeeson.com
Postal address:Department of Economics George Mason University, MSN 3G4 Fairfax, VA 22030
Workplace:Economics Department, George Mason University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Peter T. Leeson.

Last updated 2009-11-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: ple206


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Working Papers

2006

  1. Comparing Apples: Normalcy, Russia, and the Remaining Post-Socialist World
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University Downloads View citations
  2. Contagious Capitalism
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University Downloads
  3. The Use of Knowledge in Natural Disaster Relief Management
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University Downloads
  4. Weathering Corruption
    Working Papers, Department of Economics, West Virginia University Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Law & Economics (2008)

Journal Articles

2009

  1. Anarchy and Development: An Application of the Theory of Second Best
    The Law and Development Review, 2009, 2, (1), 50- Downloads
    Also in The Law and Development Review, 2009, 2, (1) (2009) Downloads
  2. Media as a Mechanism of Institutional Change and Reinforcement
    Kyklos, 2009, 62, (1), 1-14 Downloads
  3. Scott Gehlbach: Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States
    Public Choice, 2009, 141, (3), 523-525 Downloads
  4. The Laws of Lawlessness
    Journal of Legal Studies, 2009, 38, (2), 471-503 Downloads
  5. The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract
    Public Choice, 2009, 139, (3), 443-459 Downloads
  6. Two-tiered entrepreneurship and economic development
    International Review of Law and Economics, 2009, 29, (3), 252-259 Downloads

2008

  1. C.C. Gibson, K. Andersson, E. Ostrom and S. Shivakumar, The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005) ISBN 0-19-927884-9 264Â +Â xxi pp., index, $35.00
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2008, 66, (2), 437-440 Downloads
  2. Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order
    Public Choice, 2008, 135, (1), 67-78 Downloads
  3. Costly price discrimination
    Economics Letters, 2008, 99, (1), 206-208 Downloads
  4. Government intervention and the structure of social capital
    The Review of Austrian Economics, 2008, 21, (2), 209-218 Downloads
  5. How Important is State Enforcement for Trade&quest
    American Law and Economics Review, 2008, 10, (1), 61-89 Downloads View citations
  6. Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics
    American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2008, 67, (2), 331-358 Downloads View citations
  7. Media Freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation
    Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2008, 22, (2), 155-169 View citations
  8. Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange
    Journal of Legal Studies, 2008, 37, (1), 161-188 Downloads View citations
  9. Weathering Corruption
    Journal of Law & Economics, 2008, 51, (4), 667-681 Downloads
    See also Working Paper (2006)

2007

  1. An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization
    Journal of Political Economy, 2007, 115, (6), 1049-1094 Downloads View citations
  2. Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation
    Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2007, 163, (3), 467-482 Downloads View citations
  3. Balkanization and assimilation: Examining the effects of state-created homogeneity
    Review of Social Economy, 2007, 65, (2), 141-164 Downloads
  4. Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse
    Journal of Comparative Economics, 2007, 35, (4), 689-710 Downloads View citations
  5. Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence
    Public Choice, 2007, 130, (1), 245-247 Downloads
  6. Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice
    Public Choice, 2007, 133, (1), 253-256 Downloads
  7. Efficient anarchy
    Public Choice, 2007, 130, (1), 41-53 Downloads View citations
  8. Good for the Goose, Bad for the Gander: International Labor Standards and Comparative Development
    Journal of Labor Research, 2007, 28, (4), 658-676 Downloads View citations
  9. Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective
    Constitutional Political Economy, 2007, 18, (2), 127-143 Downloads View citations
  10. The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina
    Southern Economic Journal, 2007, 74, (2), 363-376
  11. The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform
    European Journal of Law and Economics, 2007, 23, (3), 237-250 Downloads
  12. Trading with Bandits
    Journal of Law & Economics, 2007, 50, 303-321 Downloads View citations

2006

  1. Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation
    The Review of Austrian Economics, 2006, 19, (2), 137-147 Downloads View citations
  2. Does the market self-correct? Asymmetrical adjustment and the structure of economic error
    Review of Political Economy, 2006, 18, (1), 79-90 Downloads
  3. Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis
    Public Choice, 2006, 127, (1), 55-73 Downloads View citations
  4. Robust political economy
    The Review of Austrian Economics, 2006, 19, (2), 107-111 Downloads
  5. Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogeneous Groups
    American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2006, 65, (4), 891-907 Downloads View citations
  6. Was Mises right?
    Review of Social Economy, 2006, 64, (2), 247-265 Downloads

2005

  1. Alexander J. Field (2001) Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN0-472-11224-4. x-373 pp
    The Review of Austrian Economics, 2005, 18, (2), 223-226 Downloads
  2. Endogenizing fractionalization
    Journal of Institutional Economics, 2005, 1, (01), 75-98 Downloads View citations
  3. Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC (2004) 230 + xiii pp., index, US$ 32.95, ISBN 0-8157-8152-0
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2005, 56, (3), 448-450 Downloads
  4. Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2005, 57, (2), 241-244 Downloads View citations
  5. The New Comparative Political Economy
    The Review of Austrian Economics, 2005, 18, (3), 281-304 Downloads

2004

  1. Read All About It! Understanding the Role of Media in Economic Development
    Kyklos, 2004, 57, (1), 21-44 Downloads View citations

2003

  1. Is the transition to the market too important to be left to the market?
    Economic Affairs, 2003, 23, (1), 33-39 Downloads View citations
 
 
Page updated 2009-11-06