Details about Wojciech Olszewski

Access statistics for papers by Wojciech Olszewski.

Last updated 2009-02-18. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pol76

Working Papers

2008

1. Falsifiability
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations
2. Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations
   Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2008) View citations
3. Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
4. Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations
   See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2008)
5. Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests
   PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania View citations
   Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (2006) View citations

2005

6. The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring
   NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org View citations
   See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2006)

2004

7. The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring
   2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics View citations

2003

8. Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games
   Levine's Working Paper Archive, David K. Levine View citations
   See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2005)

Journal Articles

2008

1. Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests
   Econometrica, 2008, 76, (6), 1437-1466 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2008)

2007

2. A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
   Economics Bulletin, 2007, 3, (58), 1-16
3. A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence
   Theoretical Economics, 2007, 2, (4), 469-487 View citations
4. Contracts and uncertainty
   Theoretical Economics, 2007, 2, (1), 1-13 View citations
5. George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-530079-6 pages i-xviii and 1-645
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, (2), 408-410
6. Preferences Over Sets of Lotteries
   Review of Economic Studies, 2007, 74, (2), 567-595 View citations

2006

7. Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2006, 128, (1), 164-186
8. The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring
   Econometrica, 2006, 74, (6), 1499-1544 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2005)

2005

9. Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games
   Econometrica, 2005, 73, (2), 377-415 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2003)

2004

10. Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2004, 46, (1), 88-114 View citations
11. Informal communication
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 117, (2), 180-200 View citations
12. Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2004, 6, (5), 707-735 View citations

2003

13. A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 42, (2), 315-318 View citations

1998

14. Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?
    International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, 27, (1), 147-156