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Details about Antonio Quesada
Access statistics for papers by Antonio Quesada.
Last updated 2008-08-04. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pqu19
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2005
- Competitive markets and “as if” methodology
Microeconomics, EconWPA
- Merging discrete measurements
Computational Economics, EconWPA
- Parallel proofs of Arrow’s and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
Public Economics, EconWPA
2004
- Networks and market laws
Microeconomics, EconWPA
- Trade, expropriation and allocation
Public Economics, EconWPA
Journal Articles
2007
- 1 dictator=2 voters
Public Choice, 2007, 130, (3), 395-400
- Merging discrete evaluations
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, 54, (1), 25-34
2006
- Hierarchical allocation
Economics Letters, 2006, 91, (1), 98-103
2005
- A positional version of Arrow's theorem
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, 41, (8), 1053-1059
- Abstention as an escape from Arrow's theorem
Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (1), 221-226 View citations
- Selling a vote
European Journal of Political Economy, 2005, 21, (1), 73-82
2003
- (100-200/m)% veto power
Research in Economics, 2003, 57, (2), 83-92
- Negative results in the theory of games with lexicographic utilities
Economics Bulletin, 2003, 3, (20), 1-7
- Positional independence in preference aggregation
Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, 20, (3), 363-370
2002
- A conflict between sequential rationality and consistency principles
International Journal of Game Theory, 2002, 31, (1), 13-18
- Another impossibility result for normal form games
Theory and Decision, 2002, 52, (1), 73-80
- Belief system foundations of backward induction
Theory and Decision, 2002, 53, (4), 393-403 View citations
- Elasticity and revenue: a reappraisal
Economics Bulletin, 2002, 4, (13), 1-5 View citations
- From social choice functions to dictatorial social welfare functions
Economics Bulletin, 2002, 4, (15), 1-6 
Also in
Economics Bulletin, 2002, 4, (16), 1-7 (2002)
- More on independent decisiveness and Arrow's theorem
Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, 19, (2), 449-454
- Power of Enforcement and Dictatorship
Theory and Decision, 2002, 52, (4), 381-387
- exposita note: Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem
Economic Theory, 2002, 20, (3), 623-627
2001
- On expressing maximum information in extensive games
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2001, 42, (2), 161-167
- On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria
Economics Bulletin, 2001, 3, 1-5
2000
- Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions
Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (3), 481-506
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