Details about Ariel Rubinstein

E-mail:
Homepage:	http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il
Phone:	+972-3-640-9601
Postal address:	school of economics tel aviv university tel aviv, israel 69978
Workplace:	Department of Economics, New York University, (more information at EDIRC) Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Ariel Rubinstein.

Last updated 2005-03-28. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pru8

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Working Papers

2004

1. Dilemmas of An Economic Theorist
   Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings, Econometric Society View citations
   Also in Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, Econometric Society (2004) View citations

2003

2. A Model of Optimal Persuasion Rules
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics
3. Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents with Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
   Also in STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE (2002) View citations
   See also Journal Article in Journal of the European Economic Association (2003)
4. Two Tales of Power and Distribution of Wealth in the Jungle
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics

2002

5. A Sampling Equilibrium with an Application to Strategic Voting
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics
   See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2003)

2001

6. Is it 'Economics and Psychology'?: The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting
   NajEcon Working Paper Reviews, www.najecon.org View citations
   Also in Working Papers, Tel Aviv (2000) View citations
   Working Papers, Tel Aviv (2000) View citations
   Levine's Bibliography, UCLA Department of Economics (2000) View citations
7. Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales
   Discussion Paper Series, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem
   See also Journal Article in Econometrica (2002)

2000

8. A,A,A,A,A or A,A,B,C,D? Over-Diversification in Repeated Decision Problems
   Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University
   Also in Working Papers, Tel Aviv (2000)
9. Correct Belief, Wrong Action and a Puzzling Gender Difference
   Working Papers, Tel Aviv View citations
   Also in Working Papers, Tel Aviv (2000) View citations

1999

10. Defineable Preferences: Another Example
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv
11. Defineable Preferences: Another Example (Searching for a Boyfriend in a Foreign Town)
    Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University
12. Economics and Language
    Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University View citations
    Also in Working Papers, Tel Aviv (1998) View citations
13. Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre and Post-Class Problem Sets as a Didactic Device
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv View citations
    Also in Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University (1999) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1999)

1998

14. Choice Problems with a "Reference" Point
    Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University
    Also in Working Papers, Tel Aviv (1997) View citations
    See also Journal Article in Mathematical Social Sciences (1999)
15. On the Question "Who is a J?": A Social Choice Approach
    Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University View citations

1997

16. Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv
    Also in Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2001)
17. Definable Preferences: An Example
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv
    See also Journal Article in European Economic Review (1998)
18. Games with Procedurally Rational Players
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv View citations
    Also in Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University (1997) View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1998)

1996

19. The Absent Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv View citations
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1997)
20. What Motives Should Guide Referees? On the Design of Mechanisms to Elict Options
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies

1995

21. Naive Strategies in Competitive Games
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv View citations

1993

22. Naive Strategies in Zero-Sum Games
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies View citations
23. Simplicity of Solution Concepts: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Extensive Games v.s. Iteratively undominated Strategies in Normal games
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies
24. Why Are Linear Orderings so Common in Natural Language?
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies

1992

25. A Remark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
    Also in Working Papers, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies (1992)
26. Finite Automata Play A Repeated Extensive Game
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv View citations
27. John Nash: The Master of Economic Modeling
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv
28. On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies View citations

1991

29. On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model
    Working Papers, Tel Aviv
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Political Economy (1993)
30. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
    See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (1994)

1990

31. Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
    Also in Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (1989) View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1992)

1989

32. NONCOOPERATIVE MODELS OF BARGAINING
    Working Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory View citations
33. Remarks on the Logic of Agreeing to Disagree Type Results (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 51 (1990), pp.184-193.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

1988

34. A Comment on the Logic of 'Agreeing to Disagree' Type Results
    Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
35. Comments on the interpretation of game theory (Now published in Econometrica, 59 (1991), pp.909-924.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

1987

36. A Game with Almost Common Knowledge: An Example (Now published in American Economic Review, 79 (1989), pp.385-391.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
37. Competitive Equilibrium in a Market with Decentralized Trade and Strategic Behaviour: An Introduction (Now published in The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment: John Robinson and Beyond, edited by G. Feiwel, (1989), pp.243-25.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
38. Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behavior and the Walrasian Outcome (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), pp.63-78.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
39. Similarity and Decision-Making Under Risk (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, 46 (1988), pp.145-153.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE View citations
40. The Complexity of Strategies and the Resolution of Conflict: An Introduction (Now published in Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation, Bryant and Portes (eds.), (Macmillan Press, 1987), pp.17-32.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
41. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata (Now published in Econometrica, 56 (1988), pp.1259-1282.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

1985

42. Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoners Dilemma (Now published in Journal of Economic Theory, No.39 (1986),pp.176-188.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE
43. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (Now published in Rand Journal of Economics, vol.17 (1986), pp.176-188.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

1984

44. Equilibrium in a Market With Sequential Bargaining (Now published in Econometrica 53 (1985), pp. 1133-1150.)
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

1983

45. The Competitive Stock Market as Cartel Maker: Some Examples
    STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Journal Articles

2004

1. On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
   Econometrica, 2004, 72, (6), 1715-1736 View citations
2. The curse of wealth and power
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 117, (1), 119-123 View citations

2003

3. "Economics and Psychology"? The Case of Hyperbolic Discounting
   International Economic Review, 2003, 44, (4), 1207-1216 View citations
4. Modeling the Economic Interaction of Agents With Diverse Abilities to Recognize Equilibrium Patterns
   Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, 1, (1), 212-223 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2003)
5. Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 45, (2), 434-441 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2002)

2002

6. Irrational diversification in multiple decision problems
   European Economic Review, 2002, 46, (8), 1369-1378 View citations
7. Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
   Econometrica, 2002, 70, (6), 2481-2488 View citations
   See also Working Paper (2001)

2001

8. A theorist's view of experiments
   European Economic Review, 2001, 45, (4-6), 615-628 View citations
9. Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2001, 36, (2), 158-173 View citations
   See also Working Paper (1997)

1999

10. Choice problems with a 'reference' point
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 1999, 37, (3), 205-209 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1998)
11. Experience from a Course in Game Theory: Pre- and Postclass Problem Sets as a Didactic Device
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1999, 28, (1), 155-170 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1999)

1998

12. Definable preferences: An example1
    European Economic Review, 1998, 42, (3-5), 553-560
    See also Working Paper (1997)
13. Games with Procedurally Rational Players
    American Economic Review, 1998, 88, (4), 834-47 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1997)
14. Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1998, 79, (2), 157-173 View citations

1997

15. A Simple Model of Equilibrium in Search Procedures
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1997, 72, (2), 432-441
16. On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 20, (1), 3-24 View citations
    Also in Mathematical Social Sciences, 1995, 30, (3), 324-324 (1995) View citations
17. The Absent-Minded Driver's Paradox: Synthesis and Responses
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, 20, (1), 121-130 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1996)

1996

18. An Extensive Game as a Guide for Solving a Normal Game
    Journal of Economic Theory, 1996, 70, (1), 32-42
19. Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
    Econometrica, 1996, 64, (2), 343-55 View citations

1995

20. Remarks on Infinitely Repeated Extensive-Form Games
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, 9, (1), 110-115 View citations

1994

21. Rationalizable Conjectural Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability
    Games and Economic Behavior, 1994, 6, (2), 299-311 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1993

22. On Price Recognition and Computational Complexity in a Monopolistic Model
    Journal of Political Economy, 1993, 101, (3), 473-84 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1991)

1992

23. On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences
    Econometrica, 1992, 60, (5), 1171-86 View citations
24. Renegotiation-Proof Implementation and Time Preferences
    American Economic Review, 1992, 82, (3), 600-614 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1990)

1991

25. Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory
    Econometrica, 1991, 59, (4), 909-24 View citations

1990

26. Decentralized Trading, Strategic Behaviour and the Walrasian Outcome
    Review of Economic Studies, 1990, 57, (1), 63-78 View citations

1989

27. Reputation and Patience in the 'War of Attrition.'
    Economica, 1989, 56, (221), 15-24 View citations
28. The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior under "Almost Common Knowledge."
    American Economic Review, 1989, 79, (3), 385-91 View citations

1988

29. The Structure of Nash Equilibrium in Repeated Games with Finite Automata
    Econometrica, 1988, 56, (6), 1259-81 View citations

1987

30. Middlemen
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1987, 102, (3), 581-93 View citations

1986

31. A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, 101, (4), 879-88 View citations
32. The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1986, 17, (2), 176-188 View citations

1985

33. A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences
    Econometrica, 1985, 53, (5), 1151-72 View citations
34. Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
    Econometrica, 1985, 53, (5), 1133-50 View citations

1984

35. The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach
    International Economic Review, 1984, 25, (3), 719-30 View citations

1982

36. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
    Econometrica, 1982, 50, (1), 97-109 View citations
37. Time Preference
    International Economic Review, 1982, 23, (3), 677-94 View citations

1979

38. A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
    Econometrica, 1979, 47, (2), 511-14 View citations

Chapters