Details about M. Remzi Sanver

Access statistics for papers by M. Remzi Sanver.

Last updated 2010-08-08. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: psa232

Working Papers

2010

1. On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions
   Working Papers, Singapore Management University, School of Economics View citations (1)

2003

2. Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
   Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University

2001

3. Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners
   Departmental Working Papers, Bilkent University, Department of Economics View citations (2)
   See also Journal Article in Social Choice and Welfare (2004)

Journal Articles

2010

1. A characterization of the Copeland solution
   Economics Letters, 2010, 107, (3), 354-355
2. A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
   Theory and Decision, 2010, 69, (3), 439-452
3. Simple Collective Identity Functions
   Theory and Decision, 2010, 68, (4), 417-443 View citations (5)

2009

4. A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2009, 66, (2), 880-892 View citations (6)
5. Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 33, (1), 159-171 View citations (2)
6. Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices
   Journal of the New Economic Association, 2009, (1-2), 37-61
7. Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences
   Theory and Decision, 2009, 67, (2), 123-144 View citations (1)
8. One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness
   International Journal of Game Theory, 2009, 38, (4), 553-574 View citations (1)
9. Sophisticated preference aggregation
   Social Choice and Welfare, 2009, 33, (1), 73-86
10. Stereotype formation as trait aggregation
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2009, 58, (2), 226-237
11. Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains
    Economic Theory, 2009, 39, (3), 461-471 View citations (3)

2008

12. Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 30, (3), 495-506 View citations (1)
13. Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains
    Economics Letters, 2008, 99, (2), 298-300
14. Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2008, 30, (1), 89-101 View citations (8)

2007

15. A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, 54, (3), 257-260 View citations (1)
16. A minimax procedure for electing committees
    Public Choice, 2007, 132, (3), 401-420 View citations (12)
17. Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28, (1), 61-76 View citations (3)
18. Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem?
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2007, 28, (3), 439-442
19. On combining implementable social choice rules
    Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 60, (1), 20-30 View citations (2)
20. On the alternating use of "unanimity" and "surjectivity" in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
    Economics Letters, 2007, 96, (1), 140-143 View citations (2)

2006

21. Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 27, (1), 211-219 View citations (3)
22. Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
    Economics Letters, 2006, 91, (2), 179-183 View citations (12)
23. Nash implementation of the majority rule
    Economics Letters, 2006, 91, (3), 369-372 View citations (2)
24. Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2006, 26, (3), 607-623 View citations (2)
25. Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
    Economic Theory, 2006, 28, (2), 453-460 View citations (8)

2005

26. Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies
    Review of Economic Design, 2005, 9, (4), 307-316
27. Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2005, 50, (3), 304-317
28. Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, 25, (1), 31-42 View citations (7)

2004

29. Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, 22, (2), 331-347 View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2001)

2003

30. Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2003, 20, (3), 477-494 View citations (7)

2002

31. An Allocation Rule with Wealth-Regressive Tax Rates
    Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2002, 4, (1), 63-69
32. Another characterization of the majority rule
    Economics Letters, 2002, 75, (3), 409-413 View citations (23)
33. Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2002, 43, (2), 151-155 View citations (1)

1999

34. Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1
    European Journal of Political Economy, 1999, 15, (2), 149-162 View citations (2)