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Details about Patrick W. Schmitz
Access statistics for papers by Patrick W. Schmitz.
Last updated 2009-11-30. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service .
Short-id: psc133
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Journal Articles
Working Papers
2009
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases
Working Papers, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Also in IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) (2008) Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim (2008) View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2009)
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?
Working Papers, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Also in Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim (2008) View citations CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2008) View citations
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Signaling an Outside Option
Discussion Papers, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
2008
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2008)
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2009)
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
2007
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2007)
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2008)
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2008)
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
See also Journal Article in Economic Theory (2008)
2006
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005)
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany
Also in Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics (2004) CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2004)
See also Journal Article in Economica (2007)
Garbled Elections
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
Also in Discussion Papers, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich (2006)
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
See also Journal Article in European Economic Review (2007)
2005
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
Also in Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany (2005) View citations
See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2005)
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (2006)
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany View citations
Also in Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics (2005) View citations CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2004)
See also Journal Article in Economic Journal (2007)
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany View citations
Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2005) View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (2005)
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in Labour Economics (2005)
2004
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003)
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
See also Journal Article in European Economic Review (2004)
2003
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
See also Journal Article in Journal of Mathematical Economics (2003)
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2002
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999)
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Theory (2002)
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
2001
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
See also Journal Article in Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr) (2004)
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances
CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations
See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2003)
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
See also Journal Article in European Journal of Law and Economics (2001)
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in Bulletin of Economic Research (2001)
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
2000
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2000)
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999)
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998)
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in International Review of Law and Economics (2000)
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals
Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany View citations
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis (2000)
1999
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (1999)
On Synergies and Vertical Integration
Discussion Paper Serie A, University of Bonn, Germany
See also Journal Article in International Journal of Industrial Organization (2001)
1998
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
See also Journal Article in Homo Oeconomicus (1998)
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1998)
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
1997
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
See also Journal Article in Public Finance = Finances publiques (1997)
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden?
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
1996
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
Journal Articles
2009
Cognitive abilities and behavioral biases
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization , 2009, 72 , (1), 147-152
See also Working Paper (2009)
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
Economics Letters , 2009, 103 , (1), 33-35
See also Working Paper (2008)
2008
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
Economics Letters , 2008, 99 , (1), 119-122 View citations
See also Working Paper (2007)
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
Economics Letters , 2008, 101 , (3), 268-271
See also Working Paper (2008)
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
Economics Letters , 2008, 99 , (3), 577-580 View citations
See also Working Paper (2007)
Task scheduling and moral hazard
Economic Theory , 2008, 37 , (2), 307-320
See also Working Paper (2007)
2007
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?
Economica , 2007, 74 , (296), 573-585 View citations
See also Working Paper (2006)
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard
Economics Letters , 2007, 97 , (3), 208-214
See also Working Paper (2007)
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information
European Economic Review , 2007, 51 , (4), 859-870
See also Working Paper (2006)
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points
Economic Journal , 2007, 117 , (520), 637-653 View citations
See also Working Paper (2005)
2006
Book Review
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) , 2006, 162 , (3), 535-542
Also in Journal of Economics , 2000, 71 , (3), 316-342 (2000)
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach
American Economic Review , 2006, 96 , (1), 422-434 View citations
See also Working Paper (2005)
2005
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions
RAND Journal of Economics , 2005, 36 , (2), 318-336 View citations
See also Working Paper (2005)
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION *
International Economic Review , 2005, 46 , (4), 1207-1231 View citations
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization , 2005, 21 , (2), 315-329 View citations
See also Working Paper (2005)
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages
Labour Economics , 2005, 12 , (6), 727-738 View citations
See also Working Paper (2005)
2004
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law
Journal of Economics , 2004, 81 , (1), 87-92
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information
European Economic Review , 2004, 48 , (5), 1027-1046 View citations
See also Working Paper (2004)
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments
Schmalenbach Business Review (sbr) , 2004, 56 , (1), 72-89 View citations
See also Working Paper (2001)
2003
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition
Journal of Mathematical Economics , 2003, 39 , (8), 901-909
See also Working Paper (2003)
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances
Games and Economic Behavior , 2003, 43 , (1), 153-173 View citations
See also Working Paper (2001)
2002
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information
Journal of Economic Theory , 2002, 106 , (1), 177-189 View citations
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems
Journal of Economic Theory , 2002, 103 , (2), 444-460 View citations
See also Working Paper (2002)
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem
European Economic Review , 2002, 46 , (1), 169-188 View citations
2001
On synergies and vertical integration
International Journal of Industrial Organization , 2001, 19 , (8), 1281-1295 View citations
See also Working Paper (1999)
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights
European Journal of Law and Economics , 2001, 11 , (1), 23-28
See also Working Paper (2001)
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory
Bulletin of Economic Research , 2001, 53 , (1), 1-17 View citations
See also Working Paper (2001)
2000
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization , 2000, 43 , (1), 115-125 View citations
See also Working Paper (2000)
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382]
International Review of Law and Economics , 2000, 20 , (4), 575-575
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation
International Review of Law and Economics , 2000, 20 , (3), 371-382 View citations
See also Working Paper (2000)
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered
FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis , 2000, 57 , (4), 394- View citations
See also Working Paper (2000)
1999
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts
Economics Letters , 1999, 63 , (2), 181-185 View citations
See also Working Paper (1999)
1998
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern
Homo Oeconomicus , 1998, 15 , 233-243
See also Working Paper (1998)
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment
American Economic Review , 1998, 88 , (4), 1027 View citations
See also Working Paper (1998)
Randomization in Coalition Contracts
Public Choice , 1998, 94 , (3-4), 341-53 View citations
Also in Public Choice , 1998, 94 , (3), 341-353 (1998)
1997
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information
Public Finance = Finances publiques , 1997, 52 , (1), 89-101 View citations
See also Working Paper (1997)