Details about Michael Waldman

E-mail:
Homepage:	http://www.gsm.cornell/facultybios/waldman.html
Phone:	(607) 255-8631
Postal address:	Michael Waldman Johnson Graduate School of Management Cornell University Sage Hall Ithaca, NY 14853
Workplace:	Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Michael Waldman.

Last updated 2009-09-01. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pwa40

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Working Papers

2008

1. Assessing the Anticompetitive Effects of Multiproduct Pricing
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

2007

2. Theory and evidence in internal labor markets
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
3. Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use?
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

2006

4. Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations
5. Does Television Cause Autism?
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
6. Optimal copyright length and ex post investment: a Mickey Mouse approach
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
7. Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts
   Working Papers, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University View citations
8. The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations

2005

9. Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets
   NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

2004

10. Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets
    CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich
11. Standard Promotion Practices vs Up-Or-Out Contracts
    Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004, Royal Economic Society

2003

12. Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    Also in Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management (2003)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Labor Economics (2006)

2001

13. Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations

1998

14. A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations
15. The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries
    University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State View citations
    Also in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (1998) View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (2002)

1990

16. A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
17. AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS AND FALSE ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE ROLE OF EXPECTATIONS
    Working Papers, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics
18. THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FALSE ANNOUNCEMENTS
    Working Papers, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics View citations
    See also Journal Article in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1990)

1989

19. Keynesian Coordination Failure and Persistence
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
20. The New Perspective on Keynesian Coordination Failure: Theory and Evidence
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
21. Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Labor Economics (1990)

1988

22. Interpreting Evidence on Returns to Tenure: The Significance of Quasi-Specific Human Capital
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
23. The Simple Case of Entry Deterrence Reconsidered
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
24. Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1991)
25. What Would Darwin Say About Rational Expectations?
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics

1987

26. Border Enforcement Versus Internal Enforcement: A Study in the Economics of Illegal Migration
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
27. Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics

1986

28. Complementarity and Partial Nonexcludability: An Analysis of the Software/Computer Market
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
29. Limited Rationality and Synergism: The IMplications for Macroeconomics
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
30. The Emergence of Copying Technologies: What Have We Learned
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
31. The Role of Altruism in Economic Interaction
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (1993)
32. The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma
    Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics View citations
    Also in UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics (1986) View citations
    See also Journal Article in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (1990)

1985

33. Information on Worker Ability: An Analysis of Inverstment Within the Firm
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Information Economics and Policy (1989-1990)
34. Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Labor Economics (1986)
35. Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Review of Economic Studies (1987)
36. Rational Expectations in the Aggregate
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
    See also Journal Article in Economic Inquiry (1989)
37. The Pros and Cons of Renegotiation
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations

1984

38. Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
39. The Role of Integrity in Economic Interaction
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations

1983

40. Interpreting Real World Contracts: An Investigation of Ex Post Mutually Beneficial Agreements
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
41. Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in RAND Journal of Economics (1984)
42. Limited Collusion and Entry Deterence
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
43. Optimal Pricing Given Transaction Costs: The Case of Reserve Versus General Admission Seating
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
44. Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics View citations
    See also Journal Article in American Economic Review (1985)
45. The Social Welfare Consequences of Limiting Nonexcludability: An Analytical Approach
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics
46. Why Bad Wokers Receive Raises
    UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics

Undated

47. MERGERS IN DURABLE-GOODS INDUSTRIES: A RE-EXAMINATION OF MARKET POWER AND WELFARE EFFECTS
    American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings, American Law & Economics Association View citations

Journal Articles

2006

1. Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms
   Journal of Labor Economics, 2006, 24, (1), 59-108
   See also Working Paper (2003)

2005

2. The Index of Leading Economic Indicators as a Source of Expectational Shocks
   Eastern Economic Journal, 2005, 31, (1), 75-95 View citations

2004

3. Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency
   Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2004, 13, (2), 273-302 View citations
4. Task-Specific Human Capital
   American Economic Review, 2004, 94, (2), 203-207 View citations

2003

5. Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets
   Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2003, 17, (1), 131-154 View citations
6. Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion
   Economic Inquiry, 2003, 41, (1), 27-41 View citations
7. Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2003, 34, (2), 247-65 View citations

2002

8. The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2002, 33, (2), 194-220 View citations
   See also Working Paper (1998)

1999

9. A Theory Of Wage And Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms
   The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999, 114, (4), 1321-1358 View citations

1997

10. Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing
    Journal of Law & Economics, 1997, 40, (1), 61-92 View citations
11. Returns to Tenure; Conceptual and Empirical Issues
    Eastern Economic Journal, 1997, 23, (3), 337-345

1996

12. Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1996, 31, (3), 419-429
13. Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters
    Journal of Business, 1996, 69, (4), 489-510 View citations
14. Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1996, 27, (3), 583-595 View citations

1994

15. Strategic Complementarity Slows Macroeconomic Adjustment to Temporary Shocks
    Economic Inquiry, 1994, 32, (2), 318-29 View citations
16. Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection
    American Economic Review, 1994, 84, (3), 482-97 View citations

1993

17. A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1993, 108, (1), 273-83 View citations
18. The role of altruism in economic interaction
    Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1993, 21, (1), 1-15 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1986)

1991

19. Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity
    Economic Journal, 1991, 101, (408), 1085-1102 View citations
20. The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1991, 22, (3), 446-453 View citations
21. Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic
    American Economic Review, 1991, 81, (5), 1345-51 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1988)

1990

22. The Macroeconomic Effects of False Announcements
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, 105, (4), 1017-34 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1990)
23. The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1990, 105, (1), 155-65 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1986)
24. Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective
    Journal of Labor Economics, 1990, 8, (2), 230-50 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1989)

1989

25. Information on worker ability: An analysis of investment within the firm
    Information Economics and Policy, 1989-1990, 4, (1), 57-80
    See also Working Paper (1985)
26. Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics
    The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1989, 104, (3), 463-83 View citations
27. Rational Expectations in the Aggregate
    Economic Inquiry, 1989, 27, (4), 619-36 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1985)

1987

28. Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
    Review of Economic Studies, 1987, 54, (2), 301-10 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1985)

1986

29. Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption
    Journal of Labor Economics, 1986, 4, (3), 355-75 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1985)

1985

30. Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity
    American Economic Review, 1985, 75, (3), 326-40 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1983)

1984

31. Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency
    RAND Journal of Economics, 1984, 15, (2), 255-267 View citations
    See also Working Paper (1983)
32. The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach
    Journal of Political Economy, 1984, 92, (2), 236-46 View citations
33. Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution
    Review of Economic Studies, 1984, 51, (1), 95-109 View citations

Chapters

1999

1. Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence
   Chapter 36 in Handbook of Labor Economics, 1999, vol. 3, Part B, pp 2373-2437 View citations