Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply

Torben M. Andersen (tandersen@econ.au.dk) and Joydeep Bhattacharya
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Torben M. Andersen: School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus, Denmark, Postal: 8000 Aarhus C, Denmark

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: Abstract. A classic result in dynamic public economics, dating back to Aaron (1966) and Samuelson (1975), states that there is no welfare rationale for PAYG pensions in a dynamically-efficient neoclassical economy with exogenous labor supply. This paper argues that this result, under the fairly-mild restriction that the old be no less risk-averse than the young, extends to a neoclassical economy with endogenous labor supply.

Keywords: pay-as-you-go; social security; endogenous labor supply; dynamic efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E6 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2009-12-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-dge and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://repec.econ.au.dk/repec/afn/wp/09/wp09_16.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: UNFUNDED PENSIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LABOR SUPPLY (2013)
Working Paper: Unfunded Pensions and Endogenous Labor Supply (2013)
Working Paper: Unfunded Pensions and Endogenous Labor Supply (2012)
Working Paper: Unfunded pensions and endogenous labor supply (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2009-16

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