To Err is Human: Implementation in Quantal Response Equilibria

Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: We study the classical implementation problem when players are prone to make mis- takes. To capture the idea of mistakes, Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium (LQRE) is used, and we consider a case in which players are almost rational, i.e., the sophisti- cation level of players, delta, approaches infinity. We show that quasimonotonicity, a small variation of Maskin Monotonicity, and no worst alternative conditions are necessary for restricted Limiting LQRE (LLQRE) implementation. Moreover, these conditions are sufficient for both restricted and unrestricted LLQRE implementations if there are at least three players and each player's worst alternative set is constant over all states.

Keywords: implementation; mechanisms; bounded rationalitym; quantal response equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D70 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2011-09-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: To err is human: Implementation in quantal response equilibria (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2011-11

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