Matching with Quorums

Daniel Monte () and Norovsambuu Tumennasan ()

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating workers to different projects in which each project requires having a minimum number of workers assigned to it or else it does not open. We show that the well-known serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy-proof nor Pareto efficient. Thus, we propose an algorithm, denoted as the serial dictatorship with project closures, which is strategy-proof and also Pareto efficient over the set of all feasible allocations.

Keywords: matching; stability; efficiency; serial dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 2012-05-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Matching with quorums (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aah:aarhec:2012-10

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