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Can a sense of entitlement increase stealing?

Christina Gravert

Economics Working Papers from Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University

Abstract: Are people more likely to steal when the payoff they deserve is determined randomly or when it depends on their performance in a difficult task? In this paper I investigate how the probability of stealing is affected by the way in which payoff is earned. After answering a short survey one group was asked to roll a die to determine their payoff, while the other group had three minutes to find matching numbers in a matrix task. Participants then paid themselves unobserved by the experimenter. I find that the participants who earned their payoff according to performance were three times more likely to take the (undeserved) maximum payoff than the participants in the random payment scheme. In contrast to previous findings in the cheating literature, stealing is an all-or-nothing decision rather than a trade-off between a slightly higher payoff and the desire to keep ones moral values intact. The results support the theory that unethical behavior is increased by a sense of entitlement, which is more pronounced when wealth depends on performance than on the roll of a die.

Keywords: Experiments; Deception; Entitlement; Justification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 K42 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17
Date: 2012-09-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-exp
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