Non-Compete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth

Sampsa Samila and Olav Sorenson

No 10-02, DRUID Working Papers from DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies

Abstract: We find that the enforcement of non-compete clauses significantly impedes entrepreneurship and employment growth. Based on a panel of metropolitan areas in the United States from 1993 to 2002, our results indicate that, relative to states that enforce non-compete covenants, an increase in the local supply of venture capital in states that restrict the scope of these agreements has significantly stronger positive effects on (i) the number of patents, (ii) the number of firm starts, and (iii) employment. We address potential endogeneity issues in the supply of venture capital by using endowment returns as an instrumental variable. Our results point to a strong interaction between financial intermediation and the legal regime in promoting entrepreneurship and economic growth.

JEL-codes: G24 K31 L26 O43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-ent, nep-fdg and nep-ino
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aal:abbswp:10-02

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