Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information

Yuji Tamura

ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics

Abstract: This study contributes to the small theoretical literature on human smuggling by assuming for the first time asymmetric information in analysis. The assumption raises the possibility of an adverse selection equilibrium where only exploitative smugglers are employed at a low fee even though migrants are willing to pay nonexploitative smugglers a high fee. More importantly, I find that improved inland apprehension of migrants may increase the incidence of migrant exploitation while failing to decrease smuggling attempts. Furthermore, improved border apprehension of migrants and smugglers may not affect the market at all.

Keywords: illegal migration; people smuggling; migrant exploitation; human trafficking; adverse selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F22 J68 K42 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 Pages
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-iue and nep-mig
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Journal Article: Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information (2013)
Journal Article: Migrant smuggling when exploitation is private information (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2013-605

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