Corporate Tax Evasion and Extortionist Governments

Ralph-C Bayer () and Julia Kupzowa
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Julia Kupzowa: Institute of Economics, University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

No 2006-08, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: We present a simple model of corporate tax evasion allowing for potentially bad governments that abuse their fiscal powers to extort monies from firms. Our model shows that the potential existence of extortionist governments provides incentives for corporate tax evasion and increases enforcement costs.

Keywords: tax evasion; extortion; corporate taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H11 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-pbe and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2006-08

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