Lobby Interaction and Trade Policy

Tatyana Chesnokova ()

No 2010-04, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: The paper introduces lobby interaction in the ''protection for sale'' framework. Special interest groups provide unconditional contributions where the marginal contribution of a lobby is decreasing in the total sum collected by the government. In contrast to the ''protection for sale'' model, for a given proportion of capital owners in the organized sectors, an increase in the number of lobbies has an impact on trade policy. It is also shown that an increase in the number of lobbies has two opposite effects on each lobby's contribution: a competition effect which lowers a lobby's contribution and a political influence effect which tends to increase its contribution.

Keywords: lobbying, interest groups, trade policy; protection for sale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/papers/doc/wp2010-04.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2010-04

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Qazi Haque ().