Tax Compliance by Firms and Audit Policy

Ralph-C Bayer () and Frank Cowell ()

No 2010-23, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Firms are usually better informed than tax authorities about market conditions and the potential profits of competitors. They may try to exploit this situation by under-reporting their own taxable profits. The tax authority could offset firms' informational advantage by adopting "smarter" audit policies that take into account the relationship between a firm's reported profits and reports for the industry as a whole. Such an audit policy will create an externality for the decision makers in the industry and this externality can be expected to affect not only firms' reporting policies but also their market decisions. If public policy takes into account wider economic issues than just revenue raising what is the appropriate way for a tax authority to run suchhttps://media.adelaide.edu.au/economics/ rules in a standard model of an industry and show the effect of these rules using simulations.

Keywords: tax compliance; evasion; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H20 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cmp and nep-pub
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http://www.economics.adelaide.edu.au/research/papers/doc/wp2010-23.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tax compliance by firms and audit policy (2016)
Working Paper: Tax compliance by firms and audit policy (2016)
Working Paper: Tax Compliance by Firms and Audit Policy (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2010-23

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