Population Monotonic and Strategy-Proof Mechanisms Respecting Welfare Lower Bounds

Duygu Yengin ()

No 2012-05, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: The significance of population monotonicity and welfare bounds is well-recognized in the fair division literature. We characterize population monotonic and incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods efficiently and respect a welfare lower bound chosen in the fair allocation problem of allocating collectively owned indivisible goods or bads when monetary transfers are possible and preferences are private information. We consider the welfare bounds that are central to the fair allocation literature, namely, the identical-preferences lower-bound, individual rationality, the stand-alone lower-bound, and k-fairness. We also compare the strength and associated budget deficits of and the logical relations between the aforementioned lower bounds.

Keywords: welfare bounds; the identical-preferences lower-bound; individual rationality; the stand-alone lower-bound; k-fairness; population monotonicity; collective ownership; allocation of indivisible goods and money; NIMBY problems; imposition of tasks; Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2012-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Population monotonic and strategy-proof mechanisms respecting welfare lower bounds (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2012-05

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