On the Credibility of Punishment in Repeated Social Dilemma Games

Ralph-C Bayer ()

No 2014-08, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Various experimental studies have shown that the availability of a punishment option can increase the prevalence of cooperative behaviour in repeated social dilemmas. A punishment option should only matter if it is a credible threat. We investigate if the degree of credibility depends on standard strategic equilibrium considerations (i.e. SPNE or NE logic) or stems from a non-strategic motivation such as reciprocity. We find that for punishment to be credible non-strategic motivations are sufficient and that subgame perfection does not further improve credibility.

Keywords: Cooperation; Punishment; Credible Threats (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D03 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2014-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2014-08

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