Characterizing Envy-Free, Strategy Proof, and Monotonic Mechanisms in Queueing Problem

Youngsub Chun and Duygu Yengin ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Firmin Doko Tchatoka

No 2018-10, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: Given a group of agents, the queueing problem is concerned with finding the order in which to serve agents and the (positive, zero, or negative) monetary transfers they should receive. In this paper, we explore the central open questions in queueing problem. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof and envy-free mechanisms. Note that no-envy implies queue-efficiency in the queueing problem. We also characterize the subclasses that generate bounded deficit or no-deficit. Then, we address the open questions regarding solidarity in the queueing problem and characterize the classes of queue-efficient and strategy-proof mechanisms which satisfy respectively (i) cost monotonicity and (ii) population/slot monotonicity. Finally, we prove that among the envy-free and strategy-proof mechanisms, the only ones that satisfy either cost monotonicity or population monotonicity are an extension of the Pivotal/Reward-based Pivotal mechanisms.

Keywords: Queueing problem; no-envy; queue-efficiency; strategy-proofness; population monotonicity; slot monotonicity; population solidarity; cost monotonicity; VCG mechanisms; Pivotal mechanisms; Reward-based Pivotal mechanism; Symmetrically Balanced VCG mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D63 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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