Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions

Eric Maskin and John Riley

No 31, Economics Working Papers from Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science

Keywords: Sealed High-Bid Auctions; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 R10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2003-02
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (90)

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Journal Article: Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions (2003)
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