Assignment Messages and Exchanges

Paul Milgrom

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2009, vol. 1, issue 2, 95-113

Abstract: "Assignment messages" are maximally general messages to describe substitutable preferences by means of a linear program. With "integer assignment messages," there exist integer-valued Walrasian allocations, extending a result of Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik (1971). Any pure Nash equilibrium profile of the Walrasian mechanism with participants limited to assignment messages is also a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted Walrasian mechanism. Assignment exchanges are generalizations of single-product double auctions and are related to ascending multi-product clock auctions and the Vickrey mechanism. Assignment messages also have additional applications in mechanism design. (JEL D44, D82)

JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.1.2.95
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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