Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games

Alessandro Pavan and Giacomo Calzolari ()

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2010, vol. 2, issue 2, 132-90

Abstract: We introduce new revelation mechanisms for simultaneous common agency games which, although they do not always permit a complete equilibrium characterization, do facilitate the characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that are typically of interest in applications. We then show how these mechanisms can be used in applications such as menu auctions, competition in nonlinear tariffs, and moral hazard settings. Lastly, we show how one can enrich the revelation mechanisms, albeit at a cost of an increase in complexity, to characterize all possible equilibrium outcomes, including those sustained by non-Markov strategies and/or mixed-strategy profiles. (JEL C72, D82, D86)

JEL-codes: C72 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.2.2.132
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.2.2.132 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games (2008)
Working Paper: Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:2:y:2010:i:2:p:132-90

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions

Access Statistics for this article

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner

More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().