Behavioral Welfare Economics and Redistribution
Marc Fleurbaey and
Erik Schokkaert
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013, vol. 5, issue 3, 180-205
Abstract:
Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent and stable preferences. This raises a challenge for welfare economics, which takes as a key postulate that individual preferences should be respected. We argue, in agreement with Bernheim (2009) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009) that behavioral economics is compatible with consistency of partial preferences, and explore how the Bernheim-Rangel approach can be extended to deal with distributive issues. We revisit some key results of the theory in a framework with partial preferences and show how one can derive partial orderings of individual and social situations.
JEL-codes: D03 D63 D71 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.3.180
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.3.180 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to AEA members and institutional subscribers.
Related works:
Working Paper: Behavioral welfare economics and redistribution (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:5:y:2013:i:3:p:180-205
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
Access Statistics for this article
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics is currently edited by Johannes Hörner
More articles in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert (mpa@aeapubs.org).