Sequential Kidney Exchange

Lawrence M. Ausubel and Thayer Morrill

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, vol. 6, issue 3, 265-85

Abstract: The traditional literature on kidney exchange assumes that all components of the exchange must occur simultaneously. Unfortunately, the number of operating rooms required for concurrent surgeries poses a significant constraint on the beneficial exchanges that may be attained. The basic insight of this paper is that incentive compatibility does not require simultaneous exchange; rather, it requires that organ donation occurs no later than the associated organ receipt. Using sequential exchanges may relax the operating-room constraint and thereby increase the number of beneficial exchanges. We show that most benefits of sequential exchange can be accomplished with only two concurrent operating rooms.

JEL-codes: D47 I11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.3.265
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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