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Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-Up of Financial Incentives for Retirement Saving

Emmanuel Saez

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2009, vol. 1, issue 1, 204-28

Abstract: We examine the effects of presentation and information on the take-up of financial subsidies for retirement saving in a large randomized experiment carried out with H&R Block. The subsidies raise take-up and contributions with larger effects when the subsidy is characterized as a matching contribution rather than an equivalent-value tax credit (or cash back), and when filers are informed before the tax season about the subsidy. The results imply that both pure incentives and the presentation of those incentives affect consumer choices. (JEL D14, H24, H31, J26)

JEL-codes: D14 H24 H31 J26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.1.1.204
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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Working Paper: Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-up of Financial Incentives for Retirement Saving (2007) Downloads
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