Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility

Adriana Camacho and Emily Conover

American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2011, vol. 3, issue 2, 41-65

Abstract: We document how manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare programs evolves over time. First, there was strategic behavior of some local politicians in the timing of the household interviews around local elections. Then, there was corrupt behavior with the sudden emergence of a sharp discontinuity in the score density, exactly at the eligibility threshold, which coincided with the release of the score algorithm to local officials. The discontinuity at the threshold is larger where mayoral elections are more competitive. While cultural forces are surely relevant for corruption, our results also highlight the importance of information and incentives. (JEL D72, I32, I38, O15, O17).

JEL-codes: D72 I32 I38 O15 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
Note: DOI: 10.1257/pol.3.2.41
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (63)

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