Central Bank Design

Ricardo Reis

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2013, vol. 27, issue 4, 17-44

Abstract: Starting with a blank slate, how could one design the institutions of a central bank for the United States? This paper explores the question of how to design a central bank, drawing on the relevant economic literature and historical experiences while staying free from concerns about how the Fed got to be what it is today or the short-term political constraints it has faced at various times. The goal is to provide an opinionated overview that puts forward the trade-offs associated with different choices and identifies areas where there are clear messages about optimal central bank design.

JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.27.4.17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (119)

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