Tax Morale
Erzo Luttmer and
Monica Singhal
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2014, vol. 28, issue 4, 149-68
Abstract:
There is an apparent disconnect between much of the academic literature on tax compliance and the administration of tax policy. In the benchmark economic model, the key policy parameters affecting tax evasion are the tax rate, the detection probability, and the penalty imposed conditional on the evasion being detected. Meanwhile, tax administrators also tend to place a great deal of emphasis on the importance of improving "tax morale," by which they generally mean increasing voluntary compliance with tax laws and creating a social norm of compliance. We will define tax morale broadly to include nonpecuniary motivations for tax compliance as well as factors that fall outside the standard, expected utility framework. Tax morale does indeed appear to be an important component of compliance decisions. We demonstrate that tax morale operates through a variety of underlying mechanisms, drawing on evidence from laboratory studies, natural experiments, and an emerging literature employing randomized field experiments. We consider the implications for tax policy and attempt to understand why recent interventions designed to improve morale, and thereby compliance, have had mixed results to date.
JEL-codes: H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: DOI: 10.1257/jep.28.4.149
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (181)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jep.28.4.149 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Tax Morale (2014) 
Working Paper: Tax Morale (2014) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aea:jecper:v:28:y:2014:i:4:p:149-68
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/subscriptions
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently edited by Enrico Moretti
More articles in Journal of Economic Perspectives from American Economic Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Michael P. Albert ().