Rent-seeking behavior in US international food aid programs

Stephanie Mercier

AEI Economic Perspectives, 2019

Abstract: US food aid programs provide rents to interest groups through cargo preference requirements and purchasing requirements raising program costs, resulting in US food aid not efficiently achieving its goals of increasing US soft power and alleviating global hunger.

Keywords: special interests; Agriculture Policy; AEI Economic Perspectives; Foreign aid; hunger; food; Rent seeking; aid; Jones Act; Mercantile Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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