Audits and the Quality of Government

Maximiliano Lauletta, Martín Rossi and Christian Ruzzier

No 4404, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers from Asociación Argentina de Economía Política

Abstract: We exploit the random assignment of Brazilian municipalities to an audit program to explore the link between audits and the quality of government. We find that audited municipalities employ less labor to provide a given level of public services, and change the way in which they screen their employees—relying less on discretion and more on merit. These improvements in bureaucratic efficiency and professionalization, which take place right away and persist four to five years after the audits, imply an increase in the quality of municipal governments.

Keywords: bureaucracy; corruption; audits; efficiency; public sector employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D78 H11 H70 J45 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-lam
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aep:anales:4404

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