Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules

Pablo Arribillaga and Agustín Bonifacio

No 4536, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers from Asociación Argentina de Economía Política

Abstract: In a classical voting problem with a finite set of (at least three) alternatives to choose from, we study the manipulation of tops-only and unanimous rules. Since strategy-proofness is impossible to obtain on the universal domain of (strict) preferences, we investigate the weaker concept of non-obvious manipulability (NOM). First, we show that NOM is equivalent to every veto from any agent being a strong veto. Second, we focus on two classes of tops-only rules: (i) (generalized) median voter schemes, and (ii) voting by committees. For each class, we identify which rules satisfy NOM on the universal domain of preferences.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://aaep.org.ar/works/works2022/4536.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (2024)
Working Paper: Obvious Manipulations of tops-only Voting Rules (2022)
Working Paper: Obvious manipulations of tops-only voting rules (2022)
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