DESIGNING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION POLICIES WITH LIMITED INFORMATION ABOUT BOTH RISK ATTITUDES AND PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY

Jeffrey Peterson and Richard N. Boisvert

No 20720, 2001 Annual meeting, August 5-8, Chicago, IL from American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association)

Abstract: A pollution reduction program is designed where information about both technology and risk preferences is asymmetric. Program costs and the distribution of payments depend on the amount of information known to the policy maker. Empirically testable conditions for self-selection are derived; the method is applied to reducing nitrate contamination.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea01:20720

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.20720

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