The Value and Applicability of Bargaining in an Intergenerational Setting

Gregory Howard

No 103227, 2011 Annual Meeting, July 24-26, 2011, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: I consider a variation of Coasian bargaining as a policy instrument for internalizing intergenerational externalities. The variation involves appointing a contemporary party to represent the interests of the affected parties who are currently unable to represent themselves, either because they are too young or have not yet been born. Potential criticisms of such a policy are considered and addressed, and precedents to such a policy are put forth. A two period model is formulated to test the effectiveness of bargaining compared to a tax and subsidy regime and is found to be comparable and robust to parameter and model adjustments.

Keywords: Environmental Economics and Policy; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea11:103227

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.103227

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