Does Contract Enforcement Limit the Distribution of Bargaining Power? An Experimental Study

Paula Cordero Salas

No 124503, 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Keywords: Financial Economics; Public Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea12:124503

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.124503

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