Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching

Mazbahul Ahamad ()

No 235482, 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts from Agricultural and Applied Economics Association

Abstract: We develop a model of two-sided matching problem with individual-sided envious preferences that originate from an emulative envy effect in which a more desirable state that is preferred is owned by the other individual. We assume envious preferences influence an individual’s decision to enter into a two-sided network instead of being unassigned. In this paper, we show that an individual-sided envious preference leads to a stable matching under a two-sided market framework. Applying the mechanism of the model to behavioral contract theory, we show that individual-proposing envious acceptance leads to stable farmer-buyer contract matching considering buyer’s time invariant preference. We further argue that individual’s envious preference also contributes to herd-type acceptance that dominates individual’s logical preferences in participation decision under a less risky environment.

Keywords: Agribusiness; Agricultural and Food Policy; Industrial Organization; Institutional and Behavioral Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12
Date: 2016-05-23
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-net and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:aaea16:235482

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.235482

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