Rent Seeking and the Common Agricultural Policy: Do member countries free ride on lobbying?

William Hartley Furtan, Maria Skovager Jensen and Johannes Sauer

No 6600, 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: The Common Agricultural Policy is modelled as a club good providing the European Union (EU) farmer with financial benefits. We build an economic model which explains how much farmers in individual EU countries invest in rent-seeking activities in order to test for free-riding behaviour on lobbying costs. For our investigation we group the EU member countries by farm structure, and the type of benefit received. We explain the fees paid by farmers for lobbying by other countries fees, political variables, and country and regional agricultural characteristics. The model shows that some member countries free ride on others. This suggests a form of policy path dependency and leads to a suboptimal investment on lobbying of 7.5%.

Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; International Relations/Trade; Political Economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaa107:6600

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6600

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