Agri-environmental schemes in the European Union: the role of ex ante costs
Jack H.M. Peerlings and
Nico B.P. Polman
No 6698, 107th Seminar, January 30-February 1, 2008, Sevilla, Spain from European Association of Agricultural Economists
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to analyse land allocation between competing agri-environmental contracts taking into account institutional issues and farm household and farm characteristics. We consider a Biodiversity Protection Contract, Landscape Management Contract and a Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract. The paper shows that it is important to study the choice for an agrienvironmental contract in combination with the choice for other agri-environmental contracts. The reasons being that a unit of land can only be allocated to one contract (although a farm can select more than one contract) and perceived relative marginal costs of contracts can change if institutional settings and farm household and farm characteristics alter. The model uses a two stage method. In the first step the probability of contract choice is determined. In the second stage these probabilities are linked to ex ante costs (including transaction costs) and optimal contract choice is determined.
Keywords: Agricultural and Food Policy; Environmental Economics and Policy; Land Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr and nep-env
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaa107:6698
DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.6698
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