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Price dispersion in thin farmland markets: What is the role of asymmetric information?

Christoph Kahle, Stefan Seifert and Silke Hüttel

No 288628, 165th Seminar, April 4-5, 2019, Berlin, Germany from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: This paper investigates the role of information and search cost in the price formation in thin farmland markets. Using a comprehensive data set with more than 10,000 transactions between 2014–2017 in one of the eastern German Federal States, we estimate a two-tier model to capture deviations from the efficient price due to search costs asymmetrically distributed between buyers and sellers. Relating these costs to the degree of professionalism, we find institutional sellers relying on public tenders to achieve the lowest losses from being information deficient. No differences can be related to farmer compared to non-farmer buyers.

Keywords: Land; Economics/Use (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2019-05-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/288628/files/Kahle-129.pdf (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Price dispersion in thin farmland markets: What is the role of asymmetric information? (2019) Downloads
Working Paper: Price dispersion in thin farmland markets: What is the role of asymmetric information? (2019) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaa165:288628

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.288628

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