When are Private Standards more Stringent than Public Standards?

Thijs Vandemoortele ()

No 115544, 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland from European Association of Agricultural Economists

Abstract: Retailers’ private standards are increasingly important in addressing consumer concerns about safety, quality and social and environmental issues. Empirical evidence shows that these private standards are frequently more stringent than their public counterparts. I develop a political economy model that may contribute to explaining this stylized fact. I show that if producers exercise their political power to persuade the government to impose a lower public standard, retailers may apply their market power to install a private standard at a higher level than the public one.

Keywords: Resource/Energy; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: When Are Private Standards More Stringent than Public Standards? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:eaae11:115544

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.115544

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