Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy

Bouwe Dijkstra and Dirk Rübbelke

No 9333, Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Abstract: We examine an incentive scheme for a group of agents, where all agents are rewarded if the group meets its target. If the group does not meet its target, only the agents that meet their individual target are rewarded. In environmental policy, the EU burden sharing agreement and the UK Climate Change Agreements feature this incentive scheme. There is only a difference in outcome between group and individual rewards if emissions are stochastic. Group rewards generally lead to higher expected emissions than individual rewards. The attraction of the group reward scheme may lie in its fairness and its tough-looking targets.

Keywords: Environmental; Economics; and; Policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/9333/files/wp070044.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy (2013)
Working Paper: Group Rewards and Individual Sanctions in Environmental Policy (2007)
Working Paper: Group rewards and individual sanctions in environmental policy (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:feemet:9333

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.9333

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